Bailout fund: crisis instrument must not become a permanent solution
24 February 2026
In 2022, the Swiss Confederation established a rescue package as an emergency instrument through the Federal Act on Subsidiary Financial Aid to Rescue Systemically Critical Companies in the Electricity Industry, known as FiREG for short. The situation on the energy markets has since calmed, and the systemically critical energy companies have significantly strengthened their risk and liquidity provisions. Nevertheless, the Federal Council proposes extending FiREG until the end of 2031. For BKW, it is clear: a crisis instrument must not become a permanent solution.
A state of emergency is not a business model
FiREG was created in a historically exceptional situation to cushion liquidity shortages resulting from extreme market distortions on the electricity exchange. Today, however, many of the risks at the time have already been addressed – through:
improved risk models and strengthened liquidity management by companies,
new regulatory foundations such as the Federal Act on the Supervision and Transparency of Wholesale Energy Markets (BATE),
market-wide adjustments to clearing and exchange rules.
What exactly is FiREG?
FiREG = Federal Act on Subsidiary Financial Assistance to Rescue Systemically Critical Companies in the Electricity Industry
Introduction: 2022 as a temporary crisis instrument
Purpose: State liquidity assistance (‘rescue package’) to ensure the electricity supply
When does it apply? In the event of an acute liquidity shortage at a systemically critical electricity company
Instrument: Subsidiary federal loans for a fee
Monitoring: Companies provide liquidity reporting, among other things; ElCom continuously monitors the situation
Current discussion: Extension until 2031 (instead of originally until the end of 2026)
Responsibility rather than a permanent solution
An emergency instrument relies on being time-limited and having a clearly defined purpose. An inappropriate extension carries the risk that a purely safeguarding mechanism becomes an implicit state guarantee – with potential distortions in competition and increased costs for companies and the economy.
This risk has also been emphasised in the parliamentary debate to date: while a narrow majority of the committee is prepared to discuss an extension, critical voices point out that companies have had sufficient time to strengthen their own provisions.
When precaution becomes a disadvantage
A particularly critical point is the provision fee: companies pay for the rescue package – regardless of whether they make use of it. This inevitably leads to a competition problem:
Companies with solid liquidity provisions incur additional costs.
Market-based hedging is effectively burdened twice.
State guarantees can distort the competitive situation.
Security is created by robust markets – not by permanent loans
Security of supply is not based on a permanently available state loan, but on robust markets, diversification, international interconnection and clear regulatory guardrails. The Federal Act on Supervision and Transparency in the Energy Markets (BATE) already provides effective instruments for market supervision and for strengthening transparency. The information obligations contained in FiREG can be continued – but without the perverse incentives associated with an extended state liquidity guarantee.
Those who strengthen provisions need no rescue umbrella
BKW rejected the rescue umbrella from the outset and has never made use of it. Accordingly, it also rejects the extension. The law should expire at the end of 2026 as planned. The electricity industry has done its homework. What is needed now are responsible and measured political decisions.
